In April 2010, one of us wrote a short retrospective of the H1N1/09 (“Swine Flu”) Pandemic, for the newly relaunched “Public Health Today”, under the guest editorship of another of us, entitled, “Modellers not public health doctors had lead in flu planning”. Its sentiments were echoed in the report on the Swine Flu Pandemic for the UK Cabinet Office by Dame Deirdre Hine, former CMO Wales, that judged that the UK government placed too much reliance on “modelling evidence”. That Cabinet Office Report went on to recommend that, “The Government Office for Science, working with lead government departments, should enable key ministers and senior officials to understand the strengths and limitations of likely available scientific advice as part of their general induction. This training should then be reinforced at the outbreak of any emergency”. In doing so the report acknowledges that the mathematical and academic nature of mathematical modelling can be attractive to hard pressed politicians and officials who aspire to “follow the science” but warns against regarding mathematical modellers as, “court astrologers”. Public Health Today, a few short years later, was no more and with it, was forgotten, in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, this particular lesson.
Indeed “court astrologers” have been ubiquitous in the COVID 19 pandemic from the moment in March 2020 when Imperial College London’s implausible predictions, the most recent example of a long history of the same, led directly to almost simultaneous lockdowns in the UK, France and the USA.
Meanwhile on 24th March 2020, in a letter to the Western Mail, “the national newspaper of Wales”, entitled, “Will social distancing actually work”, one of us wrote,
“This new virus will keep circulating until either we’ve all had it or vaccines or effective treatments become available, both solutions possibly years away. Distancing just makes the virus get round slower, and the pandemic last longer. Distancing also means less wealth and resilience to fight it.”
Previously, on 28th February, another of us had written in a BMJ editorial,
“Given the lessons from 2009—which taught us that containment for a globally disseminated disease was futile….once the disease is recognised as a global pandemic nations, commerce, and healthcare can move into a much more rational phase with resources targeted at those most at need. We should plan on the assumption that most of the population may contract the virus….”
Why have risk based approaches, or “focussed protection” as some have styled them, not been followed; neither in Wales nor elsewhere? A part of the explanation has been the dominance of mathematical modelling in the scientific advisory machinery. Welsh ministers, like many politicians and journalists, internalised the widely popularised idea of the effective reproductive rate (Rt) as a sort of epidemic volume control responding in small increments/declines to their “cautious” changes, a framework that entirely ignores the determinant role of social networks in epidemic patterns. Welsh Government’s Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) is chaired by the Chief Scientific Advisor, not the Chief Medical Officer and despite a number of members, experienced in all aspects of infection, it has been suggested, privately, that it is the mathematical modellers that have dominated the agenda. Certainly the TAC’s outputs, available online, are consistent with this explanation, for example, a paper showing that the Welsh Government’s two week October firebreak was “successful”. In this paper, arcane mathematics is used to claim success, whilst, from a simple eyeballing of the observed COVID incidence, it would be difficult to conclude other than that any effect was marginal at best.
Whilst such global approaches to pandemic management were used, loss of a focus on risk meant that preventable infections remained unprevented, evidenced by the high proportions of deaths in which the infection was acquired in hospital or care settings and the proportion of care home cases, linked to hospital discharges. Field data to orientate such approaches was available, early on in the pandemic from the “OpenSAFELY”, “ISARIC” and RCGP Research and Surveillance Centre projects, not to mention timely papers from China. Public Health Wales, subsequently, made important contributions to this work with their studies of hospital discharges and of the community screening project in Merthyr Tydfil. Empirical data from field investigations might similarly be used to establish what works in protecting the vulnerable as well as to evaluate whether some of the Welsh Government’s more singular decisions (closing selected supermarket aisles, pubs prohibited from selling alcohol, vaccine passports for night clubs) were/are of any benefit.
Finally, the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act, some of Wales most forward thinking legislation singularly failed to translate into any sort of systematic evaluation of the downsides of global “lockdown” approaches; downsides most likely to impact on just those future generations whose interests the Act seeks to protect.
What scope was there for an independent stance in Wales, given the high level of economic and social interaction with England? It has been done. Wales refused to endorse claims from DH in England that BSE could not transmit to humans, chose to wait before embarking on smallpox vaccination of health care workers, due to the high levels of side effects documented in the US, before the Iraq war and during the 2009 Swine Flu pandemic, Wales chose to use usual healthcare providers, bypassed in England by the costly, centralised and often ineffective “Flu Line” (National Pandemic Flu Service). The scope for leadership is, nevertheless, limited but should that mean that letters to Welsh ministers, from us, suggesting how more focussed approches might look, in practice, simply remained unanswered?
So this is distinctly not the view from Wales but it is a view and a view from four of us who spent much of our senior careers in the epidemiology and control of communicable diseases. So whatever form Wales’ Public Inquiry takes, we’d like to see our views, particularly in regard to the need to use real world surveillance and investigation, including of the downsides of interventions, taken into account and this time, practical lessons learned and remembered.
Roland Salmon
formerly, Director, Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre, Public Health Wales
Meirion Evans
formerly, Consultant Epidemiologist, Public Health Wales
Stephen Palmer
Emeritus Professor of Public Health, Cardiff University
John Watkins
Professor and Consultant Epidemiologist, Cardiff University