Summary
Each day that public health in England fails to adhere to basic public health control methods the cost to the country grows. Public health’s reactions to the epidemic have been hesitant, limited, centralised and unconventional. It is as though the senior staff still think this is an influenza epidemic. Now is the time for an ambitious public health response. The government say they are following scientific advice. Our public health leaders should listen to colleagues in the far east and to Public Health Directors in our own local authorities.
Public health in England is quite capable of seizing the opportunity and rapidly
- Reorienting its purpose from mitigation to control and elimination
- Setting up a robust case finding and contact tracing function at local authority level
- Devolving disease controls to local authorities to allow divergent and locally appropriate responses to future outbreaks
- Requiring the control of travel where necessary
- Explaining that control must precede easing of physical distancing measures and this will be achieved quicker in some parts of the country than others
- Explaining the key role each member of the public has if they become unwell.
Introduction
According to the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR), the GDP in the UK will shrink by 35% in the second Quarter 2 of the fiscal year on account of the COVID-19 lockdown. The cost during the period of ‘full lockdown’ from 23rd March to 7th May will be about £92 billion. This is equivalent to £2 billion a day (1). Is there anyway the public health measures in the UK could have reduced the lockdown period and saved some of this cost? What strategy will minimise costs in the future?
Different countries have used alternative approaches. The successful ones so far have gone for elimination not mitigation. Elimination requires rapid isolation of all known cases and contacts, which in turn requires prompt identification of cases and contacts within hours not days. Successful control means universal physical distancing is not necessary because targeted isolation of cases and contacts is sufficient to curtail the epidemic. This level of control has been achieved in countries using this approach (2–6). How successful has public health in England been in each phase of the epidemic?
Phases
The COVID-19 epidemic can be considered to have three phases – (i) the containment phase which seeks to eliminate the virus infection from the population, followed if this fails by (ii) the mitigation phase, which in many countries including the UK has matured into a suppression phase, which seeks to minimise the effects of the epidemic by suppressing transmission, followed when successful by (iii) the control phase which seeks to re-establish containment.
Containment phase
WHO declared the outbreak was a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 31st January and in the UK the containment phase was abandoned seven weeks later on 23rd March. The first case was identified on 1st January and by 23rd March 5,683 cases had been identified including 335 hospital deaths. Public Health England (PHE) has not published details of what exactly it did during this phase, but one can assume it was case finding, contact tracing and isolation of travellers from infected countries. Apparently, this activity stopped when the containment phase was abandoned. The failure to contain the epidemic at this stage has cost the country a massive sum both in terms of health and socio-economic wellbeing.
Mitigation phase
The lockdown began on 23rd March. It has succeeded in supressing transmission to the extent that the NHS has not been overwhelmed. Five weeks into the mitigation phase while the rate of new deaths is falling there is no control of the epidemic. Control requires an understanding of the state of the epidemic from surveillance, complete case finding and contact tracing. What could have been done to gain control of the epidemic during this phase?
Surveillance
For the first time since the start of the epidemic on 23rd April PHE published a COVID-19 surveillance report describing details of the available surveillance data (7). The report, updated weekly, contains no analysis and minimal commentary. It contains no mention of:
- An estimate of the number of actual rather than known cases by age and sex
- The number of contacts traced per case by risk category, average time since case identification, test result and trace failure
- The specificity and sensitivity of the tests in use
- An estimate of the number of asymptomatic cases
- The current reproduction number for each region
- The number, size and location of outbreaks.
These figures are required to gain an understanding of the epidemic and its control. Some countries provide these estimates on a daily, weekly or fortnightly basis.
Case finding and contact tracing
No system of notification and control
Case finding and contact tracing were abandoned at the start of the mitigation phase for no publicised reason. Perhaps public health wanted to reserve tests for NHS cases. Testing never has been an essential component of case finding in public health and a shortage of tests is not a valid excuse to stop contact tracing. The European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) has updated guidance on contact tracing with or without testing (8). PHE still has not provided similar information needed to build up the system here:
- A case definition and recommended follow up actions
- Contact definitions and recommended follow up action
- A streamlined notification system including a database system such as the WHO’s Go.data tool to assist staff at local level and staff centrally
- Instructions for 111 call centres, GPs, hospitals and care homes to use the database.
Too little, too late
On 24th April the Government announced the recommencement of case finding and contact tracing in England. A meagre 18,000 people will be involved initially. Much reliance seems to be placed on a new and untested smart phone application. The number to be recruited seems symptomatic of the inability to appreciate the need to control the epidemic and how to do this expeditiously and at scale.
The number of people required to successfully identify, test and contact trace varies from local authority to local authority (9). The number of staff required will fall as the number of new cases falls, which in China in provinces other than Hubei was 5.5% a day after the peak of cases (5). A recent report taking into account changes in case definition suggests a decay rate of 18% a day (10). In two weeks’ time by 6th May the numbers will be 1.6/1000 population or five times the number proposed by the Government (Table 1). Staff numbers required will be less if the decay rate is nearer 18% so the numbers for the 6th May in Table 1 are conservative. If our lockdown measures are less effective than in China then the staff numbers required will need to be somewhat higher.
Table 1 – Personnel required to test and trace contacts by English region

Not going local
If contact tracing had been built up from the start, it is clear from the regional figures in Table 1 that the East of England, the North West, the South East and the South West with half the number of deaths for their size as compared to the other regions would have been able to handle the number of cases by now. The economies of these regions which represent two thirds of the nation’s population could have been gradually resumed between 22nd April and 28th April.
The remaining high incidence regions should have been able to take control soon after 6th May. There would not have been the need to maintain economic shutdown after that date if the contact tracing system had been built up and working.
The socio-economic cost of the public health strategy so far
The cost of the lockdown from 23rd March to 7th May will be about £92 billion. The lockdown could have been eased 14 days earlier in the low incident regions if they had taken control of the epidemic then. This would have saved £15 billion of the lockdown cost (Table 2). Each day the lockdown continues past 7th May will cost an additional £1.7 billion.
Table 2 – Estimate of cost of delayed control of epidemic in England

Getting back on track – the potential gains
The control phase
Each day the control phase is delayed will cost the country £2 billion. But the control phase can only safely be initiated when the mitigation phase has reduced new cases to a level which can be handled by case finding and contact tracing.
This phase will be difficult and will need to last until herd immunity stops transmission. It requires rapid 100% case finding and contact tracing, an ability to enforce quarantine and travel restrictions and local knowledge and resources to investigate and deal with outbreaks.
Case finding and contact tracing
For case finding and contact tracing to be effective:
- Every new case must be found and isolated within 24 hours and the source of the infection identified if possible
- All close contacts need to be identified within two days and isolated for 14 days or until a negative test result
- Isolation needs to be monitored daily to ensure compliance.
The following points need to be emphasised: –
- Testing is helpful but not necessary to identify cases, which can be done on a symptoms only basis. The workload will be higher as two thirds of suspected cases will not actually have the virus but manageable (9). Clinical judgement is required as the test is not 100% sensitive with a proportion of false negative results inevitably emerging.
- Unlike influenza the longer incubation period of Covid-19 allows contact isolation to be the key to successful control. Basically there are three days to find and quarantine the high-risk contacts (11).
- Contact tracing apps would help but are not essential; the higher the uptake the easier will be the listing of contacts. Again the number of volunteers required to undertake the work is manageable. Table 1 does not assume an app will be available.
- Management of case identification and tracing contacts can only be done at local authority level as the amount of detail of the local population, geography, community, health staff and laboratory is only available locally.
- Travel restrictions between regions will be needed if the source of more than a handful of new infections comes from outside the region.
Outbreak investigation and control
Until a vaccine provides herd immunity the control phase will be punctuated by local outbreaks with the potential for one or more very large outbreaks. As already appreciated in New Zealand which has just entered the control phase these outbreaks will need to be anticipated and dealt with expeditiously (12). Local teams will help each other when necessary.
What preparations have been made to set up these control measures?
It appears that the system is trying to keep controls at central and regional levels, presumably because they have no staff of their own at local level (13). It is difficult to see how control is possible unless:
- local authorities who have the local experts available including directors of public health, health visitors and environmental health officers are given responsibility for case finding, contact tracing, enforcement of quarantine and travel restrictions
- surveillance is available at regional level.
Lifting the lockdown and cutting costs
Every day control is delayed will cost £2 billion. Control will be achieved in different regions at different times. Lockdown can be lifted as soon as the epidemic is under control in each region. The local economy can then emerge. To wait for the last region to achieve control will frustrate the rest of the country. Decentralised decisions about universal physical distancing measures will reduce costs.
Conclusion
Here is an identifiable public health strategy, other than the one the Government seems to be adopting, which would save a lot of money, allow restrictions to be eased in different parts of the country depending on the state of infections, and allow us to remain generally on top of the pandemic until a vaccine becomes available. Our public health leaders should listen to colleagues in the far east and Lewis, the Dauphin “Strong reasons make strong actions. If you say, ay, the king will not say no.” (Shakespeare; King John, Act III, Scene IV).
Written Dr Cam Bowie, retired director of public health, Somerset and professor of community health, Malawi. cam.bowie1@gmail.com. Axminster, EX13 5BL
References
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7. PHE. Weekly COVID-19 surveillance report published [Internet]. GOV.UK. [cited 2020 Apr 25]. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/weekly-covid-19-surveillance-report-published
8. ECDC. Contact tracing: Public health management of persons, including healthcare workers, having had contact with COVID-19 cases in the European Union – second update [Internet]. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. 2020 [cited 2020 Apr 28]. Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19-contact-tracing-public-health-management
9. Bowie C, Hill A. Re: Is it possible to implement the proposals in the Editorial ‘Covid-19: why is the UK government ignoring WHO’s advice? (1)’. 2020 Apr 29 [cited 2020 Apr 29]; Available from: https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m1284/rr-9
10. Tsang TK, Wu P, Lin Y, Lau EHY, Leung GM, Cowling BJ. Effect of changing case definitions for COVID-19 on the epidemic curve and transmission parameters in mainland China: a modelling study. Lancet Public Health. 2020 Apr 21;
11. Baker M, Kvalsvig A, Verrall AJ, Telfar-Barnard L, Wilson N. New Zealand’s elimination strategy for the COVID-19 pandemic and what is required to make it work. N Z Med J. 2020 03;133(1512):10–4.
12. Rapid Audit of Contact Tracing for COVID-19 in New Zealand [Internet]. Ministry of Health NZ. [cited 2020 Apr 30]. Available from: https://www.health.govt.nz/publication/rapid-audit-contact-tracing-covid-19-new-zealand
13. Pollock AM, Roderick P, Cheng KK, Pankhania B. Covid-19: why is the UK government ignoring WHO’s advice? BMJ. 2020 30;368:m1284.
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